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Plaintiff/Appellant Capri Sunshine, LLC ("Capri''), by and through counsel and
pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, respectfully submits this petition for
rehearing of Capri Sunshine, LLC v. E & C Fox Investments, LLC, 2015 UT App 231
(September 11, 2015) (the "Opinion") (attached as Addendum 1).

INTRODUCTION
This case arises out of Capri's efforts to protect its interest in real property
commonly known as the Rail Event Center (the "Raif'). 1 Capri rightfully owns the Rail.
Defendant/Appellee E & C Fox Investments ("Fox") first attempted to foreclose on the
Rail in 2011 (the "First Sale"). At that time, Capri's predecessor-in-interest ("Smith")
was a junior lienholder. Smith challenged the validity of the sale and himself foreclosed
on the Rail on February 15, 2012. The district court set aside the First Sale in April 2013.
As the First Sale was declared void, Smith owned the Rail from the date of his
foreclosure until his interest passed to Capri, which owns the Rail to this day.
In May 2013, Fox again attempted to foreclose on the Rail. Capri requested a
payoff statement from Fox and received a statement that inflated the amount actually due
by several hundred thousand dollars (the "Inflated PayoffAmount"). Capri had arranged
for financing to payoff Fox's trust deed at the correct amount owed, but was unable to
obtain the financing unless and until Fox agreed to accept the correct amount owed.
Accordingly, Fox prevented Capri from paying off the obligation and preventing the

1

This Introduction summarizes the facts contained in Capri's Statement of the Case in its
Opening Brief. The Opening Brief, in turn, drew heavily from Capri's First Amended
Complaint. See Appellant's Br. 9-22.
1

second foreclosure sale (the "Second Sale") or outbidding Fox due to the Inflated Payoff
Amount. The district court denied Capri's request for preliminary injunction to prevent
the Second Sale and later refused to set the sale aside. The district court dismissed
Capri's claims, and Capri timely appealed. The Court issued the Opinion on September
11, 2015.
The Opinion is a dramatic blow to all owners of encumbered real property in Utah
and all junior lienholders. The Opinion gives senior lienholders carte blanche to
foreclose on real property, demand more than is due, and proceed to sale based on the
inflated payoff amount. Under the Opinion, there is nothing that an owner or junior
lienholder can do before, during, or after the sale to challenge the inflated payoff amount.
The owner or junior lienholder must pay the inflated amount to protect its rights in the
subject real property-even if, practically speaking, it is impossible to secure the
necessary financing.
Capri timely petitions for rehearing (the "Petition") and requests the Court grant
the Petition.

POINTS OF LAW AND FACT TO CONSIDER ON REHEARING

I.

Did Capri adequately demonstrate that Fox's Inflated Payoff Amount

violated Capri's rights under common law and Utah Code Annotated§§ 57-1-31, 57-131.5 & 57-1-28?
2.

Was dismissal with prejudice appropriate if Capri could have stated a claim

by specifically pleading that it tendered payment for the correct amount due to Fox or
that tender was futile or excused?
2

3.

Did Capri adequately demonstrate that it owned the Rail at the time of the

Second Sale?
ARGUMENT

A.

Capri Adequately Demonstrated that the Inflated Payoff Amount Violated Its
Rights.
The Court's opinion states that Capri did not provide any legal authority or

reasoned analysis support the proposition that the inflated payoff amount violated Utah
law. To the contrary, Capri cited ample authority in its Opening Brief and Reply Briefto
support its contention that it had a common law right to payoff Pox's trust deed. Capri
also discussed how common law, Utah Code Annotated§§ 57-1-31, 57-1-31.5 & 57-128, and common sense prevent a lender from demanding more than is actually due.
Capri devoted no fewer than seven (7) pages of its Opening Brief and five (5) pages of its
Reply Brief to the various authorities establishing these principles. The Opinion gives
little countenance to Capri's arguments and authorities and, in essence, declared these
issues inadequately briefed. See Opinion ,r,r 14, 18. A brief summary of these arguments
and authorities follows, along with citations to the applicable portions of the briefs.
1.

Capri Had an Equitable and Common Law Right to Payoff Fox's
Trust Deed.

The Opinon makes no mention of Young v. Embley, 143 P.3d 936,940 (Alaska

2006) or the other authorities that Capri cited to support its claim to a common law right
to payoff Fox's trust deed(s). See Appellant's Br. 25-26. Granted, Capri did not cite a
Utah case for this proposition. Capri acknowledged the dearth of Utah authority on this

3

point and explained why, as an issue of first impression in Utah, there was no reason to
depart from the common law rule. Appellant's Br. 26-27.
Capri also explained the interaction between the common law and Utah Code
Annotated§ 57-1-31 ("Section 57-1-31")-which partially codifies an interested party's
right to redeem real property. See id. Capri argued that the statute does not preempt the
broader, common law right to payoff an encumbrance at any time (even when not faced
with foreclosure). See id. This was the court's conclusion in Young and neither Fox nor
the Court articulated any reason to reach a different conclusion. See Young, 143 P.3d at
941.
Capri still cannot provide the Court with a Utah case discussing an owner's or
junior lienholder' s common law right to payoff encumbrances on property in which they
have an interest. See Young, 143 P.3d at 941. Common sense and general equitable
principles counsel this Court to recognize such a ~ight, as the court did in Young. Capri,
whether as the Rail's owner or a junior lienholder, had a right to prevent the Second Sale
by paying Fox the amount owed. Fox trampled that right by insisting on receiving the
Inflated Payoff Amount.

2.

Q

Utah Code Annotated §§ 57-1-31, 57-1-31.5 & 57-1-28 Support Capri's
Argument That A Lender May Not Demand More Than the Amount
Actually Owed.

Capri does not argue that Fox should have given it a right to reinstate the loan or
cure the default under Section 57-1-31. Capri acknowledged in its Reply Brief that the
Opening Brief was confusing on this point. See Reply Br. 8-9 & n.6. Capri invoked
Section 57-1-31 for two reasons.
4

First, Capri pointed out that nothing in that section abrogated Capri's rights to
payoff, prior to the Second Sale, the full amount that it owed Fox. This was one of the
court's holdings in Young where it analyzed a statute very similar to Section 57-1-31.
Under Section 57-1-31, a party unwilling or unable to pay the full amount of the
obligation can instead pay only the amount due at that time. Thus, if anything, Section
57-1-31 augmented and broadened the common law right to redeem property prior to
foreclosure, which traditionally required "payment of the full amount mortgaged." See
Young, 143 P.3d at 943.

Second, when a party invokes Section 57-1-31, the statute is clear that the party
need pay only the amount ''then due" under the trust deed (plus certain fees). It would be
absurd to read that statute as allowing a lender to require more or to knowingly inflate the
amount claimed owing. The Opinion should disavow rather than embrace this reading.
See Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P 'ship, 2011 UT 50, ,r 26, 267 P.3d 863

("Generally, when interpreting statutes [the Utah Supreme Court] seek[s] to avoid
interpretations which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd." (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
In light of the foregoing, the Court missed the mark when it focused on whether or
not Capri had a right to "cur[e] the default." See Opinion ,r 14. Capri cited ample
authority for its right to payoff the full obligation and at the amount that was actually
owed as opposed to an inflated amount. Section 57-1-31 was merely one of the
authorities cited for this notion. Section 57-1-31.5 also supports Capri's argument for a
similar reason. Section 57-1-31.5 defines "Payoff statement" as "a statement ... that an
5

interested party requests in order to obtain the amount required to pay off a loan secured
by a trust deed." It then grants an interested party the right to request a statement "of the
amount required to be paid ... to pay off a loan secured by a trust deed." See U.C.A.

§ 37-1-31.5(2)(a)(i). The right to receive a pay off statement would be and is, under the
Opinion, completely worthless if the Lender could simply inflate the amount owed. The
Inflated Payoff Amount deprived Capri of its right under Section 37-1-31.5(2)(a)(i)
because it did not reflect ''the amount required to be paid ... to pay off a loan secured by
a trust deed."

It is worth noting that Fox never argued that it would have or could have refused
payment if Capri tendered the Inflated Payoff Amount. Indeed, nowhere did Fox argue
or imply that Capri did not have the right to payoff the trust deed at all. Rather, the
implication is that Capri had no right (or at least no mechanism) to challenge the Inflated
Payoff Amount. The district court agreed and refused to enjoin the sale even though this
Court has previously counseled parties to seek an injunction to avoid a defective sale.

See Reynolds v. Woodall, 2012 UT App 206,
Ellison, 2011 UT App 290,

~

~

14,285 P.3d 7; RM Lifestyles, LLC v.

15 & n.4, 263 P.3d 1152 (citing Harline v. Campbell, 728

P.2d 980, 981 (Utah 1986)). The district court allowed the Second Sale to go forward
and, as expected, Fox won at auction where it bid based on the Inflated Payoff Amount.

It is difficult to see how an inflated credit bid does not constitute a prejudicial
defect in the Second Sale. Utah Code Annotated 57-1-28 gives a creditor the right to bid
only "the unpaid principal owed" plus accrued interest, certain expenses, and transaction
costs. If Fox credit bid more than this at the Second Sale, it exceeded its right. As such,
6

G

it is unclear what the Opinion means when it says that "[n]othing in Capri's argument
demonstrates that Fox Investments' bid exceeded the amount prescribed by statute or that
Fox Investments did not pay its bid according to the statute's requirements." See Opinion

,I 17. Capri argued (and alleged in the Complaint) that Fox exceeded the amount
prescribed by statute to the tune of several hundred thousand dollars. See Appellant's Br.
16, 29-31. And, this is not a case, as the Opinion suggests that a creditor bid to the limit
of its credit and then paid the remainder of the purchase price in cash. See Opinion ,I 17.
Even if Fox had the right to bid more than the credit, see Opinion ,I 17, the Inflated
Payoff Amount assured that he did not have to.
Notwithstanding the deficiencies in the payoff statement and the inflated credit
bid, the Opinion treats Capri's argument for setting aside the sale in only one paragraph.
See Opinion ,I 19. Again, Capri devoted numerous pages of its briefs to establish how the

defects constituted "irregularit[ies]" that had "the effective of chilling the bidding and
causing an inadequacy of price." See, e.g. Appellant's Br. 34-36 (citing Reynolds, 2012
UT App 206; Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, 86 P.3d 699). It should go without saying
that a property owner cannot be expected to secure financing to outbid a lienholder that is
allowed to credit bid money it is not actually owed. But that is exactly what happened in
this case. As Capri alleged in the Complaint, it could not obtain the necessary financing
to outbid Fox. See Appellant's Br. 10 (citing R.283). As such, the Court cannot assume,
as the Opinion states, that Capri's rights were protected '"by the requirement that the
trustee distribute any surplus proceeds to the person legally entitled thereto."' See
Opinion ,I 17 (quoting Jackson v. Halls, 2013 UT App 254, ,I 8, 314 P.3d 1065). The
7

Inflated Payoff Amount and Fox's inflated credit bid based on that amount assured that
there would be no "surplus proceeds" by pricing any potential bidders (including and
especially Capri) out of the Second Sale.
Capri raised the foregoing arguments in its Opening and Reply Briefs, 2 and its
argument was not "[w]ithout reasoned analysis or supportive legal authority." See
Opinion ,r 14. The foregoing summary should crystallize Capri's common law and
statutory arguments and authorities. The Court should grant the Petition with respect to
these points.
B.

Capri's Complaint Raised a Reasonable Inference of Tender or Futility of Tender.
Perhaps the Court implicitly recognized Capri's right to redeem the Rail prior to

foreclosure when it discussed Capri's purported failure to tender performance. See
Opinion ,r,r 15. The Court apparently would have expected Capri to offer (funds in hand)
at least the amount it claimed was owed. The Opinion acknowledged that "dismissal is
justified only when the allegations of the complaint clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff
does not have a claim." See Opinion ,r 11. The Opinion further stated that ''Capri has
made no effort to show that its claims would succeed if amended." See id.

,r 25.

Capri argued at some length that tender was either impossible or excused as futile.
See Reply Br. 25-26. And, even more importantly, the Complaint stated that Capri was

ready, willing, and able to payoff Fox at the amount actually owed. Appellant's Br. 1516. This fact, coupled with the rest of the chronology showing that Fox went forward

2

See Appellant's Br. 27-31, 34-36; Reply Br. 6-10, 15-17.
8

with the Second Sale, raise a reasonable inference that tender was either impossible or
excused. Capri could not have had the funds available for disbursement unless Fox
agreed to the amount. And, it would have been futile to make the offer cash in hand
where it was already refused.
Even if the Court does not believe that excuse or futility of tender is a fair
inference from the Complaint as pleaded, Capri could readily amend the Complaint to
include allegations regarding Fox's refusal to accept the amount Capri offered. As this
Court has previously noted, "[t]he question of whether a tender would have been fruitless
is fact-intensive." See Jenkins v. Equipment Center, Inc., 869 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994). As such, the issue is not properly resolved on a motion to dismiss. And
dismissal with prejudice is improper where, as here, the Complaint can be amended to
allege facts demonstrating excuse or futility of tender. See Carlton v. Brown, 2014 UT 6,

,r 15 n.5, 323 P.3d 571

("'[D]ismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) generally is not final or on the

merits and the court normally will give plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint'
except in situations where 'it appears to a certainty that plaintiff cannot state a claim,' in
which case dismissal with prejudice is appropriate." (quoting Alvarez v. Galetka, 933
P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1997)). The Court's discussion of tender does not signal this as a
case where "it appears to a certainty that [Capri] cannot state a claim." See id. In fact,
the discussion indicates just the opposite. At a minimum, the Court should grant the
Petition and reconsider whether the district court should have granted Capri leave to
amend the Complaint.

9

C.

Capri Adequately Demonstrated That It Owned the Rail at the Time of the
Second Sale.

The Opinion concludes that Capri's claims for accounting and waste rise and fall
on Capri's argument that it owned the Rail. This is not strictly true. It is undisputed that
Fox arrived at the Inflated Payoff Amount by, among other things, passing on all
expenses of operating the Rail but failing to credit any of the income received (or that
should have been received). Regardless of whether Capri was an owner or merely a
junior lienholder, Fox should have credited the income from the Rail to someone. Thus,
it should not have been able to claim what it did in the Inflated Payoff Amount. Capri
pointed this out in the Reply Brief. See Reply Br. 22-24.
With respect to the ownership issue, the Opinion concludes that Capri failed to
support its ownership claim "with reasoned analysis or legal authority." See Opinion~
21. The Opinion also states that "Capri does not challenge the legal correctness of the
court's determination that Fox Investments was the owner of the property until May 1,
2013." See id~ 23. But Capri amply demonstrated as a matter of both fact and law that
Smith (and later Capri) owned the Rail after Smith foreclosed in 2012. Capri directs the
Court's attention to Capri's discussion of this issue in its Opening Brief (at 14-15) and its
Reply Brief (at 18-22).
Capri's Opening Brief laid out the factual basis for Capri's claim to ownership of
the Rail. Smith foreclosed his trust deeds on the Rail and purchased the Rail on credit
bid. Smith later transferred it to Capri, which owned it at the time of the Second Sale.

See Appellant's Br. 14-15.
10

Fox did not challenge the fact of the Smith foreclosure sale-or even its validityonly its legal effect. Capri's Reply Brief devotes considerable attention to Fox's
argument that Smith's foreclosure did not transfer title to him. See Reply Br. 19-22. The
crux of Fox's argument was that the First Sale, though ultimately deemed invalid,
prevented Smith from obtaining title. See id. Fox relied on Burnett, Waldock & Padgett
Inv. v. C.B.S. Realty, 668 P.2d 819 (Alaska 1983), which is inapposite and runs contrary

to Utah law. Capri cited a number of cases from the Utah Supreme Court, this Court, and
courts in other jurisdictions to support the notion that an invalid trustee sale is void and,
therefore, has no effect on the validity of an intervening sale by a junior lienholder. See
RJW Media, Inc. v. CIT Group/Consumer Fin., Inc., 2008 UT App 476, ,r 30,202 P.3d

291; Harline v. Campbell, 728 P .2d 980, 982 (Utah 1986); Gilroy v. Ryberg, 667 N. W.2d
544, 554 (Neb. 2003); Williams v. Kimes, 996 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Mo. 1999). Capri owns the
Rail because Smith foreclosed and purchased the Rail in 2012 and because Fox's First
Sale is void under Utah law and has no effect on Smith's or Capri's ownership of the
Rail. If any party failed to cite dispositive authority or carry its burden of persuasion, it is
Fox. Thus, it is unclear what else the Court would have expected in terms of "reasoned
analysis or legal authority" to support Capri's claim to ownership of the Rail. See
Opinion ,r 21. Capri urges the Court to grant the Petition on this point.
CONCLUSION

Capri had a right to payoff Fox's trust deed( s) at the correct amount owed. Fox,
armed with the Inflated Payoff Amount, was able to outmaneuver Capri before, during,
and after the sale. The district court erred when it refused to enjoin the Second Sale and
11

when it declined to set aside the Second Sale. The Court should now avoid compounding
that error. Capri respectfully requests that the Court reconsider the Opinion and grant the
Petition.

CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(c), counsel for Capri certifies
that the Petition is presented in good faith and not for delay.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of September, 2015
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON

James K. acy
Stacy J. McNeill
James C. Dunkelberger
Attorneys for Appellant
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JUDGE KATE A. TOOMEY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES
J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN concurred.

TOOMEY, Judge:
<j[l
Capri Sunshine, LLC (Capri) appeals the district court's
decision granting E & C Fox Investments, LLC's (Fox
Investments) motion to dismiss Capri's complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which ,relief can be granted. Capri argues that
Fox Investments prevented it from paying off a foreclosed debt
when Fox Investments purportedly inflated the payoff amount
and then bought the property at auction for more than the
amount due. We affirm the district court's dismissal.

Capri Sunshine v. E & C Fox Investments
BACKGROUND
'Il2
"In reviewing the trial court's decision, we accept the
factual allegations in the complaint as true and interpret those
facts and all inferences drawn from them in light most favorable
to the plaintiff as the non-moving party." Oakwood Vill. LLC v.
Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, en 9, 104 P.3d 1226. We therefore
recite the facts in accordance with the factual allegations in
Capri's complaint.
'Il3
Between 2007 and 2009, Scott Logan Gallaher and Sharon
Western Gallaher took out five large loans to construct The Rail
Event Center, a concert venue in Salt Lake City, Utah. Four
separate trust deeds secured repayment of the loans. The first,
and highest priority, trust deed was for a $975,000 loan from
Granite Federal Credit Union (Granite). The second trust deed
was for a $500,000 loan, also from Granite. The third trust deed
secured two loans from Vernon D. Smith totaling approximately
$2,347,000. The final trust deed was for a $1,000,000 loan from
Ernest Fox.
'Il4
In 2010, the Gollahers defaulted on the Granite loans, and
Granite recorded a notice of default and intent to sell the
property. Fox Investments, an affiliate of Mr. Fox, purchased the
two Granite trust deeds, including the promissory obligations
secured by those deeds. Fox Investments then filed notice of
default and its intent to sell the property at public auction.
Although Fox Investments' notice of sale listed the time of sale
as 9:00 a.m. on January 10, 2011, the sale was not conducted until
9:45 a.m., without proper postponement. After the January 2011
sale, in which Mr. Fox was the highest bidder, Mr. Fox's trustee
conveyed title of the property to Fox Investments and took
possession of the property.

'ITS
Mr. Smith filed a lawsuit asking the court to set aside the
sale based on Mr. Fox's trustee's failure to properly postpone the
time of the sale. But before the lawsuit was resolved, Mr. Smith's
trustee held its own trustee's sale in which Mr. Smith was the
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highest bidder. On February 15, 2012, a trustee deed was
executed purportedly conveying ownership of the property to
Mr. Smith. 1
'fi6
In April 2013, the district court set aside Fox Investments'
January 2011 sale, noting that "there were defects in the notice of
the foreclosure sale and that such did have a 'chilling' effect, at
the very least, to Mr. Smith's bid." Mr. Smith then recorded the
February 2012 deed and conveyed title of the property via
quitclaim deed to Capri. Capri quickly served Fox Investments a
fifteen-day notice to vacate the property. But Fox Invesbnents
refused, claiming Mr. Smith's foreclosure sale was invalid.

<JI?

On May 1, 2013, the district court entered its final order
setting aside the January 2011 sale. Fox Investments again
gave notice of its intent to foreclose on its first trust deed and
sell the property at public auction.. Capri requested a payoff
amount for Fox Investments' first and second trust deeds. In
accordance with the requirements enumerated in Utah Code
section 57-1-31.5, Fox Investments gave Capri a payoff
calculation of approximately $1,500,000 for the first deed and
$650,000 for the second. In response, Capri hired a forensic loan
auditor to determine the accuracy of the amounts. The auditor's
report concluded that Fox Investments' payoff amounts had
been overstated and inaccurate after finding that late fees were
improperly incorporated into the payoff amounts, that interest
on the loans and attorney fees were miscalculated, and that
certain benefits were not properly considered.
<JIB
On May 15, 2013, Capri moved the court to issue a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to stop
Fox Investments from proceeding with its trustee's sale, which
the district court denied the same day. Fox Investments held a

1. This is the date Capri claims Mr. Smith became the rightful
owner.

20140523-CA
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trustee's sale on May 17, 2013. Capri bid $1,000,000, but Fox
Investments countered with a $1,600,000 credit bid and won.

19

Capri filed another lawsuit asserting claims for
declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, accounting, waste, and
unlawful detainer. 2 In response, Fox Investments filed a
counterclaim for quiet title to the property and moved to dismiss
Capri's complaint, claiming that Capri lacked standing to assert
its claims and otherwise failed to state claims upon which relief
could be granted. The district court granted Fox Investments'
motion and dismissed Capri's claims with prejudice. 3 Capri
appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
110 On appeal, Capri raises several issues challenging the
district court's order granting Fox Investments' rule 12(b)(6)
motion. First, Capri challenges the court's dismissal of its
declaratory judgment claims, which asked the district court to
determine that Fox Investments' payoff statement and bid
violated Utah law. Second, it argues the court erred in
dismissing its claims for accounting, waste, and unlawful
2. In its complaint, Capri renewed its request for a preliminary
injunction to stop Fox from conducting its sale. Capri conceded
before the district court that this request was moot. On appeal, it
again argues the court erred in denying injunctive relief. This
issue is still moot." An issue is moot when resolution of it cannot
affect the rights of the parties." Cox v. Cox, 2012 UT App 225,
121, 285 P.3d 791. Even if Capri demonstrated some error in the
court's decision not to enjoin Fox's sale, this court cannot stop
the sale after it has occurred.
3. The court also issued an order granting relief on Fox
Investments' counterclaim and its request to release a lis

pendens filed by Capri.
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detainer. Finally, Capri argues the court erred when it dismissed
Capri's complaint with prejudice.

'Jill

"A trial court's decision granting a rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss a complaint for lack of a remedy is a question of law that
we review for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's
ruling." Oakwood Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, <JI 9,
104 P.3d 1226. "In reviewing the dismissal, we must keep in
mind that the purpose of a rule 12(b)(6) motion is to challenge
the formal sufficiency of the claim for relief, not to establish the
facts or resolve the merits of a case." Whipple v. American Fork
Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996). Thus, we note that
"dismissal is justified only when the allegations of the complaint
clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a claim." Id.

ANALYSIS
<j{12 Capri first challenges the district court's decision to
dismiss its declaratory judgment claims seeking to set aside Fox
Investments' trustee's sale as a matter of law for failure to
comply with Utah Code sections 57-1-28, -31, and -31.5. Capri
contends that Fox Investments' inaccurate payoff amount
deprived it of the opportunity to cure the default under section
57-1-31. And, although it concedes that Fox Investments' payoff
statement did not technically violate section 57-1-31.5, Capri
argues the statement was nevertheless "substantively and
fundamentally flawed because it grossly overstate[d] the amount
actually due." We disagree.
C)I13 To determine the sufficiency of Capri's complaint, we
must first examine the applicable law. Section 57-1-31 allows any
person with a subordinate lien on the trust property to cure an
existing default in the performance of any obligation secured by
the trust deed. In particular, it allows the subordinate lienholder
to "pay to the beneficiary ... the entire amount then due under
the terms of the trust deed (including costs and expenses
actually incurred in enforcing the terms of the obligation, or trust
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deed, and the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred)" "at
any time within three months of the filing for record of notice of
default under the trust deed." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31(1)
(LexisNexis 2010). Upon request, the trustee must provide a
detailed listing of the costs and fees required to pay off the
defaulted loan. See id. § 57-1-31.5(2)(a)-(b), (3). If the default is
not cured, the trustee can sell the property at public auction to
the highest bidder. See id.§§ 57-1-27, -28.
'll14 Although it has provided ample authority supporting its
right to redeem the property, Capri has not provided any legal
authority or reasoned analysis supporting the proposition that
Fox Investments' inflated payoff amount violates the duties
prescribed under either statute. See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,
304-05 (Utah 1998) (explaining that the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure require "development of [legal] authority and
reasoned analysis based on that authority"); see also Utah R. App.
P. 24(a)(9). Moreover, Capri does not point to any allegations in
its complaint that suggest Fox Investments actually refused
payment or otherwise denied Capri the opportunity to cure the
default. Instead, Capri suggests Fox Investments' purportedly
inflated payoff amount prevented it from curing the default.
Without reasoned analysis or supportive legal authority, this
argument fails to demonstrate how the facts alleged in Capri's
complaint, if proven, support a claim that entitles it to relief. See
Thomas, 961 P .2d at 305 (explaining that this court will not take
on the burden of argument or research if the appellant fails to
develop applicable authority); see also Whipple, 910 P.2d at 122122 (providing that a rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is appropriate where
"it is clear that plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any facts
that could be proved" (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Furthermore, Capri fails to demonstrate that the facts as
alleged show it performed the obligations necessary to redeem
the property. Under Utah law, to exercise the right to cure a
default, Capri needed to "pay to the beneficiary ... the entire
amount then due under the terms of the trust deed (including
<J{15
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costs and expenses actually incurred in enforcing the terms of
the obligation, or trust deed, and the trustee's and attorney's fees
actually incurred)." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31(1). Generally,
"[a]n unconditional tender of performance in full by a [junior
interest holder], even if rejected by the mortgagee, if kept good
has the effect of performance." Restatement (Third) of Property:
Mortgages § 6.4(g) (1997). But simply indicating a willingness to
pay without tendering payment is insufficient for performance.
Cf Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Assocs., 795 P.2d 665, 670
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("Informing an obligee that you are ready
and willing to perform the contract is insufficient." (citing
Century 21 All W. Real Estate & Inv., Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52, 5556 (Utah 1982); Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45, 47 (Utah 1974))). In
other words, Capri needed to allege that it made a bona fide
offer to pay the amount due on the lien or that tender was
excused. Cf Jenkins v. Equipment Ctr., Inc., 869 P.2d 1000, 1002-03
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that tender of the amount of a lien
is required before a party can maintain a conversion claim). But
beyond asserting it was "ready, able, and willing to pay off
both" of Fox Investments' trust deeds, nothing in the complaint
suggests Capri actually offered or tendered payment to cure the
default-even for the amount it believed to be accurate.
'Il16 Capri also argues that Fox Investments "exceeded its right
provided under Section 57-1-28" by bidding higher than the
purported payoff amount at the sale. In particular, it argues
section 57-1-28 allows Fox Investments "to bid only the actual
balance of the [first trust deed] plus the associated fees and
expenses." We disagree.

117 Capri's argument quotes the statute out of context and
suggests that Utah Code section 57-1-28(1)(b) prohibits a
beneficiary from bidding more than the unpaid principal owed
and other associated fees and expenses at a trustee's sale. But
this statute merely restricts the amount of credit that may be
applied to the beneficiaries' bid; it does not restrict the amount
the beneficiary may bid at auction. Utah Code Ann. § 57-128(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2010). It provides that "[t]he beneficiary
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shall receive a credit on the beneficiary's bid in an amount not to
exceed" the combined amount of the "unpaid principal owed,"
accrued interest, taxes, insurance, maintenance, the beneficiary's
lien, and the "costs of sale, including reasonable trustee's and
attorney's fees." Id. Moreover, "[s]enior trust deed holders or
lienholders may combine their interests to bid for the property at
a trustee's sale, but only by following the statutory mandate that
[the purchaser must pay the price bid]." Randall v. Valley Title,
681 P.2d 219, 222 (Utah 1984) (citing an earlier, but substantially
similar, version of Utah Code section 57-1-28(l)(a)). Allowing a
credit bid at auction by no means alters the character of the
transaction or relieves Fox Investments from its obligation to
pay, but merely offers the convenience of avoiding the useless
ceremony' of payment to the [trustee] by the very party which is
entitled to receive the proceeds of the sale." Jackson v. Halls, 2013
UT App 254, <JI 8, 314 P.3d 1065 (citation omitted). Furthermore,
"junior interests are protected by the requirement that the
trustee distribute any surplus proceeds to the person legally
entitled thereto. Randall, 681 P.2d at 221-22. Nothing in Capri's
argument demonstrates that Fox Investments' bid exceeded the
amount prescribed by statute or that Fox Investments did not
pay its bid according to the statute's requirements. See Utah
Code Ann.§ 57-1-28.
111

11

<jl18 Accordingly, Capri fails to demonstrate that the facts, if
proven, show Fox Investments violated Utah Code sections 57-131 and -31.5, and Capri has not demonstrated that a remedy for
any such violation would include setting aside the trustee's sale.
Moreover, it has not demonstrated an error in the bidding that
occurred at the trustee's sale. We therefore conclude that the
district court did not err in dismissing Capri's declaratory
judgment claims.
<JI:19 Second, Capri asserts Fox Investments "had the role of a
mortgagee-in-possession" with a duty to collect rents, and as
such Capri "is entitled to a full accounting of the rents that Fox
Investments could have, should have, or did receive during its
occupation ... [and to] the extent that Fox [Investments] has
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failed to make productive use of the [property], it is liable for
waste." Furthermore, Capri, somewhat contradictorily, argues
"Fox Investments was a mortgagee in unlawful possession." We
disagree and conclude that Capri has failed to meet its burden of
persuasion on appeal.
ci[20 Each of these arguments depends on Capri's ownership in
the property or successful redemption of the property. See
Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, LC, 2010 UT 29, <J[<f[ 22-24,
232 P.3d 999 (determining that Utah's unlawful detainer statute
provides a mechanism for resolving conflicts over lawful
possession of property between landowners and tenants); 54A
Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 186 (2009) ("The duty to account arises
upon redemption .... or foreclosure sale .... "); 54A Arn. Jur. 2d
Mortgages § 182 ("[T]he mortgagee may pursue a remedy for
waste against the mortgagor where the mortgagor, without the
mortgagee's consent, retains possession of rents to which the
mortgagee has the right of possession ...."). But whether Capri
owned the property is a legal question-the answer turns on
whether Mr. Smith's foreclosure and sale of the property were
proper considering his trustee's sale occurred after a prior
trustee's sale effectively extinguished Mr. Smith's interests in the
property. Because we are reviewing a dismissal on the
pleadings, we assume as correct the facts that Mr. Smith's trustee
conducted a trustee's sale of the property from which he
purportedly conveyed ownership of the property to Capri, but
we do not similarly assume as correct the legal conclusion that
Capri had ownership in the property. Cf Bush v. Bush, 184 P. 823,
825-26 (Utah 1919) (in the absence of pleadings concerning the
right of possession, Utah courts will not indulge in presuming
the right of possession from the asserted fact of ownership);
Capital Assets Fin. Servs. v. Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998) (determining the ownership of a property represents
a legal conclusion the parties are not qualified to make), aff'd sub
nom. Capital Assets Fin. Servs. v. Maxwell, 2000 UT 9, 994 P.2d 201.
ri!21 We conclude that Capri has failed to support a necessary
element of its claims-ownership or the right to possession-
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with reasoned analysis or legal authority. Accordingly, Capri has
failed to carry its burden of persuasion on appeal.
<j[22 Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires
the appellant's brief to set forth "the contentions and reasons of
the appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied
on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). While failure to cite the pertinent
authority may not always render an issue inadequately briefed,
it does so "when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as
to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing
court." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998).
<j[23 Here, Capri has done nothing in its brief or complaint to
demonstrate how the facts it alleges, if proven, support its right
to possess the property. Capri's legal arguments assume that it is
the legal owner of the property during the relevant period. Yet
Capri does not challenge the legal correctness of the court's
determination that Fox Investments was the owner of the
property until May 1, 2013. Rather, it advances conclusory
arguments for accounting, waste, and unlawful detainer with
only an implication of its right to own or possess the property.
Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err in
dismissing the accounting, waste, and unlawful detainer claims,
because Capri has failed to persuade us otherwise.
<j[24 Finally, Capri argues that even if we conclude the
complaint was "deficient on any of the foregoing claims,
dismissal with prejudice was nevertheless unwarranted" because
the facts of the case could have supported other claims for relief
not presented in the complaint. It argues the court erred in not
allowing it to amend its complaint and asserts that on remand it
will "plead trespass and injunctive relief to bar Fox Investments'
unlawful possession" of the property.
<j[25 "Dismissal with prejudice ... is a harsh and permanent
remedy when it precludes a presentation of plaintiff's claims on
their merits." Bonneville Tower Condo. Mgmt. Comm. v. Thompson
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Michie Assocs., Inc., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1986) (per curiam).
Dismissal with prejudice should, therefore, be used with caution.
That said, although the district court dismissed these claims
early in the proceedings, it resolved them on their merits after
deeming them lacking. The court even reviewed the alleged facts
under different possible theories that would potentially entitle
Capri to relief and determined the arguments would still fail.
Capri has not demonstrated the court erred in its analysis of the
issues. Moreover, Capri has made no effort to show that its
claims would succeed if amended, or that claims for trespass or
injunctive relief would succeed if the facts in the complaint were
proven. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err
in dismissing Capri's claims with prejudice.

CONCLUSION
'1126 The district court did not err when it dismissed Capri's
complaint, because Capri failed to demonstrate that the facts
in the pleadings, if proven, would support a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Capri has also failed to demonstrate
that Fox Investments violated Utah Code sections 57-1-28, -31,
and -31.5 or to demonstrate that a violation of those statutes
would support setting Fox Investments' trustee's sale aside.
Because Capri has done nothing to support its assertion that it
had a right to possess the property, it has also failed to
demonstrate how the alleged facts support claims for
accounting, waste, and unlawful detainer. Finally, the court did
not err in dismissing Capri's claims with prejudice, because it
decided Capri's claims on their merits and Capri has not
demonstrated how amended pleadings would support a claim
upon which relief can be granted. We therefore affirm the
district court's dismissal of Capri's causes of action and we
award costs on appeal to Fox Investments.
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